SHIN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

10/10/2016 5:41 PM

TREATMENT AS AN INDIVIDUAL
AND THE PRIORITY OF PERSONS
OVER GROUPS IN
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
PATRICK S. SHIN*
The Supreme Court has said that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution and Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination require that all
persons be treated as individuals and that the laws operate primarily to
protect “persons, not groups.” This article shows that the legal
requirement of individual treatment has two distinct components: a rule
invalidating inferences about persons based on their membership in
protected groups and a rule prohibiting disparate treatment for the sake
of group interests or intergroup equality. The first rule is rooted in moral
principles of respect for individual autonomy. The second rule is a
principle that gives lexical priority to individual rights over group
welfare. Both are formal, anti-classification rules that abjure reliance on
group concerns, and both are central to antidiscrimination law. Neither
rule, however, mandates group-blindness or entails the categorical
irrelevance of group classifications. Antidiscrimination law cannot be
completely understood without reference to goals of substantive
intergroup equality. The rules of individual treatment and the protection
of “persons, not groups” represent formal constraints on the means by
which substantive equality can be sought. They should not be mistaken
as substitutes for it.
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INTRODUCTION
Given certain social conditions, treating racial groups differently
could increase equality and efficiency. For example, if two racial groups
in a society have unequal representation in a selective college, and if
this inequality is unjust, an obvious way to reverse this inequality would
be to reserve a certain number of seats in each class for the
underrepresented group. Or, if members of one racial group engage in
a particular unwanted illegal behavior at a much higher rate than
members of another group, and if the government has limited resources
to police that behavior, efficiency would seem to dictate expending
more resources on monitoring members of the racial group that
exhibits the higher rate of the unwanted behavior. Similarly, if valid
statistics show that members of one racial group perform better at a
particular employment-relevant task than members of another,
efficiency might likewise support giving preference to the higherperforming group in selective hiring processes.
But, of course, antidiscrimination law prohibits or places significant
constraints on these sorts of “obvious” solutions. It is illegal to remedy
racially disproportionate representation in university student bodies
through outright racial rebalancing or quota-based selection
procedures.1 Racial profiling, at least in its crudest form, arguably
violates the Equal Protection Clause.2 And employment practices
cannot be based on generalizations – even empirically supportable
ones – about work-related attributes of members of a particular racial
group.3
In general, our antidiscrimination frameworks, especially in the
context of race, make it problematic to pick out individuals for different
treatment based solely on the justification that this would increase
1. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003); Regents of Univ. of Calif. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (plurality) (Powell, J.).
2. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (dictum) (“[T]he Constitution
prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race.”); United States
v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1134–35 (9th Cir. 2000). But cf. United States v. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976) (holding that border officials do not violate Fourth Amendment
by considering the “apparent Mexican ancestry” of a vehicle’s occupants as a factor in requiring
the vehicle to pull over to a secondary inspection area).
3. See L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (invalidating sexdifferentiated pension contribution requirements based on statistical data showing that women
live longer than men); cf. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989) (holding that
employer cannot make generalizations about behavior based on sex); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S.
429, 433 (1984) (suggesting that the “reality” of a race-based disadvantage does not make it a
valid reason for decision making). See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,”
Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 851–52 (2003).
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intergroup equality, or on the basis of generalizations about a particular
group’s behavior. As the Supreme Court has said, both the Equal
Protection Clause and the antidiscrimination provisions of Title VII
operate to protect “persons, not groups.”4 Antidiscrimination law
frowns upon regarding persons as merely fungible instances of the
groups to which they belong and requires instead that persons be
treated “as individuals”5 and be given “individualized consideration”6
in decisions involving differential distributions of benefits and burdens.
This article examines the Supreme Court’s notion of the right to be
treated as an individual rather than as a member of a group. What
exactly does this right require or prohibit? What normative or moral
commitments does the right embody? In Part I, I explain why the law’s
prioritization of persons over groups cannot be reduced to a simple rule
of “group blindness” dictating the absolute irrelevance of group
membership to individual treatment. In Part II, I survey some of the
cases in which the idea of protecting individuals has been invoked, and
I tease out two distinct concerns that animate the Court’s insistence on
treating persons as individuals. In Part III, I propose two principles that
capture those concerns. In Part IV, I develop an account of individual
treatment rooted in the moral values of respect for autonomy and the
inviolability of rights and show how these values can explain certain
shared intuitions and legal doctrines in controversial contexts such as
racial profiling and affirmative action. I conclude with some
observations about the role and significance of the notion of individual
treatment within the broader context of antidiscrimination law as a
whole.
I. AVOIDING OVERSTATEMENT OF THE IRRELEVANCE OF GROUPS
The ideas that all persons have a right to be treated as individuals
rather than as members of groups and that antidiscrimination law
protects persons, not groups might at first suggest a broad rule that all
group classifications must be disregarded in determining the treatment

4. In the constitutional context, see Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 742–43 (2007); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995);
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22
(1948). In the Title VII context, see Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982); Manhart, 435 U.S.
at 702.
5. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) (Equal Protection Clause); Ariz. Governing
Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1083 (1983) (Title VII) (quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708).
6. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336; see Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa Clara, 480 U.S. 616, 638
(1987).
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to which a person is entitled. What is meant by treatment as an
individual rather than as a member of a group, one might hypothesize,
is that groups and group classifications are always irrelevant to the
operation of our antidiscrimination laws, and that a person’s
membership in a particular group can never be regarded as a relevant
reason for giving a benefit to or imposing a burden on a person. But
this would prove too much. Whatever the right to individual treatment
means, it cannot plausibly be interpreted as a commitment to absolute
group blindness.
As a descriptive matter, antidiscrimination law does not in fact
disallow the use of all group classifications. Group classifications are
pervasive, and most do not trigger any legal concern whatsoever. There
is nothing objectionable, for example, about a university admissions
policy that automatically rejects all applicants who failed to complete
high school. No one would raise an individual treatment objection to a
singing group’s exclusion of all people who are tone-deaf. Any process
of selection based on discernible criteria necessarily entails
classification of people by groups defined by the operative criteria.7
Because reliance on group classifications is inherent to any selection
process, the right to be treated as an individual cannot be interpreted
to mean that a person’s treatment can never be based on consideration
of group membership.8
One might reply that the idea of treating persons as individuals
rather than on the basis of their group membership should be
interpreted to prohibit only actions based on irrelevant group
classifications. But this, too, will not work. If an employer decided to act
on “an irrational animus against people who are six feet tall, who are
from St. Louis, or who root for the Blue Devils,”9 it is unlikely that
antidiscrimination law as it exists today would have anything to say
about it. Title VII law does not contain any general prohibition against
reliance on irrelevant group classifications,10 and any such general
constraints imposed by rational-basis review under the Equal

7. See Ronald Dworkin, Bakke’s Case: Are Quotas Unfair?, in THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
DEBATE 109 (Steven M. Cahn ed., 2002).
8. See BENJAMIN EIDELSON, DISCRIMINATION AND DISRESPECT 134 (Oxford Univ. Press
2015); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES AND STEREOTYPES 19 (Harvard Univ.
Press 2003); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 125–26 (Harvard Univ. Press 1999) (arguing that equality principles do not forbid
classificatory judgments per se, and “almost all classifications involve ‘groups’” of some kind).
9. Bagenstos, supra note 3, at 846.
10. See id.
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Protection Clause are weak at best.11 Thus, the idea of treatment as an
individual cannot accurately be formulated as a principle that dictates
the irrelevance of group classifications nor as a principle that prohibits
reliance on group classifications that are irrelevant.
A less sweeping approach that is closer to the truth would
conceptualize the requirement of individual treatment as a principle
dictating the legal irrelevance of a selected set of group classifications
of which the law has good reason to be wary. Both Title VII and the
Supreme Court’s constitutional equality jurisprudence presuppose that
some group classifications – those that have either been recognized as
constitutionally suspect or are specifically enumerated in Title VII and
other antidiscrimination statutes – have greater significance than
others, for various reasons.12 Although antidiscrimination law cannot
be interpreted to require that all group classifications be disregarded, it
does seem to say that these “enumerated” group classifications must be
regarded as irrelevant in selective processes that pick out individuals
for preferential or adverse treatment.13
Recognizing that antidiscrimination law requires some but not all
group classifications to be regarded as irrelevant does not prove,
however, that the law is blind to the interests of groups defined by the
enumerated classifications. On the contrary, the fact that
antidiscrimination law dictates irrelevance for only a select set of
enumerated group classifications strongly suggests that group-based
concerns are relevant to the purposes of the law itself.14 The ascription
of categorical irrelevance to some classifications but not others is
justified by concerns about the groups bearing those classifications. For
example, antidiscrimination law goes out of its way to forbid
consideration of membership in racial groups but not other
classifications that might be just as irrelevant (e.g., height, eye color) or
11. See Deborah Hellman, Two Concepts of Discrimination, 102 VA. L. REV. 895 (2016).
12. Cf. Bagenstos, supra note 3, at 846; see also Patrick S. Shin, Is There a Unitary Concept
of Discrimination?, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF DISCRIMINATION LAW (Deborah
Hellman & Sophia Moreau eds., 2013).
13. In other writings, I have used the term “enumerated factors” to refer to the group
classifications that are singled out by positive federal antidiscrimination law for special scrutiny –
which would include at least race, color, religion, sex, national origin. See Shin, supra note 12, at
167.
14. For a very similar point, see William D. Araiza, Constitutional Rules and Institutional
Roles: The Fate of the Equal Protection Class of One and What It Means For Congressional Power
to Enforce Constitutional Rights, 62 SMU L. REV. 27, 36 (2009) (arguing that while the Supreme
Court has insisted on the “personal” nature of equal protection rights, “standard equal protection
law does in fact turn on groups, or at least on the classification traits (such as race and gender)
that define group membership”).
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consideration of which might exacerbate existing injustices (e.g.,
socioeconomic status). Why? The most plausible justification is that the
enumerated classifications pick out categories of persistent unjust
inequality that afflict our society and, because of their social and
psychological salience, require special monitoring.15 In short, the law’s
prohibition of treatment on the basis of race is a response to, and an
attempt to rectify, actual and potential racial injustice and inequality.
Antidiscrimination law’s selective prohibition of group classifications
is thus predicated upon concerns about particular groups in our society.
In summary, the right to be treated as an individual rather than as a
member of a group is not a general right against treatment on the basis
of group classification, but rather a right not be treated on the basis of
any of the legally enumerated classifications. The justification of the
enumerated classification approach is itself based on group-based
concerns, such as the existence of unjust inequality among racial groups.
Thus, the right to be treated as an individual is in part a function of such
group concerns, rather than a rejection of their normative significance.
The important upshot is that although the right to be treated as an
individual imposes constraints on how the law can address concerns of
comparative group welfare and inequality, that right cannot be asserted
as a basis for repudiating such concerns.
II. THE TWO CONCERNS UNDERLYING THE RIGHT TO INDIVIDUAL
TREATMENT
If the right to be treated as an individual is not reducible to a
rejection of group-based concerns, then what exactly are the normative
commitments underlying that right? In this section, I tease apart two
distinct ideas that tend to be packed together within the common
dictum that every person has a right to be treated as an individual
rather than as a member of a group. Identifying these somewhat
different concerns will help clarify the values that lie beneath this right.
The first concern tends to arise in connection with actions that
involve the use of generalizations about a prohibited group as a basis
for the treatment of a particular individual. This category of actions
would include racial stereotyping,16 the consideration of race as a proxy
for work-relevant attributes (“statistical discrimination”),17 the
15. See Shin, supra note 12, at 169–72; see also Tommie Shelby, Race and Ethnicity, Race
and Social Justice: Rawlsian Considerations, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1697, 1707 (2004).
16. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989).
17. See generally David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in
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conflation of racial group membership with particular viewpoints or
political preferences,18 and racial profiling.19 The concern typically
expressed about such actions is that they fail to respect persons as
individuals, treating them as if they were nothing more than “the
product of their race.”20 Consider, for example, the well known case of
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart.21 In Manhart,
the employer implemented a policy requiring female employees to
make larger pension contributions than male employees, based on
actuarial statistics that showed that women generally live longer than
men and hence would be likely to receive higher total payouts from the
pension fund.22 The Court invalidated the sex-differentiated pension
policy, asserting that under Title VII, “employment decisions cannot be
predicated on mere ‘stereotyped’ impressions about the characteristics
of males or females.”23 It held that the law “precludes treatment of
individuals as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual, or
national class” and, therefore, “[e]ven a true generalization about the
class is an insufficient reason for disqualifying an individual to whom
the generalization does not apply.”24 The rule that emerges from
Manhart and similar cases is that the treatment of a person should not
be based on a likelihood that the person fits a generalization – even if
the generalization is statistically supportable – about the racial or
gender group (or other enumerated class) to which the person belongs.
The second distinct concern contained in the idea of treatment as
an individual rather than as a member of a group arises in a slightly
different category of disputed treatment. This second category includes
the use of quotas or quota-like mechanisms to increase minority

Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619 (1991). Strauss defines
statistical discrimination as “the use of race as a proxy for characteristics related to productivity.”
Id. at 1639; see also Bagenstos, supra note 3.
18. See Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 621 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 911, 911–912 (1995).
19. I employ the term “racial profiling” in this article to refer to the law enforcement
practice of focusing investigative resources on individuals of a particular race, based on statistical
evidence (valid or spurious) that members of that racial group are more likely than non-members
to engage in criminal activity. Cf. EIDELSON, supra note 8, at 178.
20. Miller, 515 U.S. at 912 (quoting Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 604 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
21. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
22. See id.
23. Id. at 707.
24. Id. at 708.
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presence,25 contested forms of affirmative action,26 and attempts to
justify race-conscious action by appeal to group consequences.27 For
example, in Connecticut v. Teal,28 two minority employees had failed a
written examination used by the employer as a qualifying step for
eligibility for promotion to the position of supervisor. The plaintiffs
challenged the employer’s use of the examination on a Title VII
disparate impact theory.29 The employer’s response was that any racial
disparate impact created by the written exam was more than
counterbalanced by the fact that the employer promoted minorities on
the eligibility list at a significantly higher rate than whites, resulting in
an absence of disparate impact at the “bottom line.”30 Writing for the
Court, Justice Brennan rejected the employer’s argument, asserting
that “[t]he principal focus of the statute is the protection of the
individual employee, rather than the protection of the minority group
as a whole.”31
Another case that provides an example of the second concern is
Parents Involved.32 There, in response to Justice Breyer’s argument that
the race-conscious school assignment policy at issue could be justified33
on the grounds that the policy would “improve conditions of race”34
and help bring about the integration of racial groups,35 Chief Justice
Roberts asserted that these group-based consequences were not valid
reasons for giving preferred school assignments to particular
individuals on the basis of race.36 Putting racial classifications to use for
the purpose of group benefits would be “fundamentally at odds,” he
wrote, with the clearly established rule that the Constitution protects
“persons, not groups.”37 The second concern underlying the idea of the
right to be treated as an individual, then, is that a person’s treatment

25. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
26. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
27. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 453–54 (1982); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22
(1948).
28. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
29. See id. at 444, 446–47.
30. See id. at 453.
31. Id. at 453–54.
32. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
33. Or at least should not be subjected to constitutional strict scrutiny.
34. See id. at 828 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
35. See id. at 828–29.
36. See id. at 742–43.
37. Id. (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)) (italics in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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cannot be justified solely based on the expected consequences for
group welfare or equality.
In short, the two concerns that animate the idea of treatment as an
individual are (1) a concern about people being treated differently on
the basis of inferences derived from their membership in enumerated
groups; and (2) a concern about the subordination of individual rights
to the collective interests of an enumerated group or to considerations
of intergroup equality.
III. THE PRINCIPLES OF INDIVIDUALIZED CONSIDERATION AND
INDIVIDUAL PRIORITY
In this section, I attempt to crystallize the two concerns discussed
in section II into two specific principles that jointly embody the right
to be treated as an individual rather than as a member of a group. As
discussed in section I, these principles do not require absolute groupblindness. Rather, they reflect the law’s actual approach: selective
ascription of irrelevance to certain enumerated classifications, namely,
the group classifications listed in Title VII and suspect classifications in
the Supreme Court’s Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence. And,
pursuant to the discussion in section II, the principles give expression
to both an anti-generalization concern and a concern about the
subordination of individual to group interests.
The first proposed principle says that people should not be treated
adversely or preferentially on the basis of generalizations about the
enumerated groups to which they may belong. In other words, people
are entitled to consideration as individual persons, not as fungible
tokens of any suspect class. This idea, which I will label the Principle of
Individual Consideration, can be formulated as follows:
Individual Consideration. Adverse or preferential treatment of a
person cannot be justified by an inference about the person derived
from the person’s membership in an enumerated group.

The second principle is one that emphasizes the priority of the
individual over concerns pertaining to the welfare of an enumerated
group or the promotion of intergroup equality. I believe that this is the
principle that animates the slogan that the law protects “persons, not
groups.” This second principle, which I will refer to as the Principle of
Individual Priority, can be articulated as follows:
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Individual Priority. Adverse or preferential treatment of a person
cannot be justified by an expectation that such treatment would
benefit an enumerated group or would improve or not worsen
conditions of equality between such groups.

These two principles, when combined, give content to the right to
be treated as an individual rather than as a member of a group, as well
as the notion that antidiscrimination law primarily protects persons, not
groups.38 I will refer to the compound principle comprised by merging
the Principles of Individual Consideration and of Individual Priority as
the Principle of Treatment as an Individual, which can be stated like
this:
Treatment as an Individual. Adverse or preferential treatment of a
person cannot be justified by (1) an inference about the person
derived from the person’s membership in an enumerated group; or
(2) an expectation that such treatment would benefit an enumerated
group or would improve or not worsen conditions of equality
between such groups.

The general Principle of Treatment as an Individual can be
narrowed in particular contexts of group classification. For example, in
the specific context of racial classification, the Principle of Treatment
as an Individual might be formulated in the following way:
Treatment as an Individual Without Regard to Race. Adverse or
preferential treatment of a person cannot be justified by (1) an
inference about the person derived from the person’s race; or (2) an
expectation that such treatment would benefit members of some
racial group or would improve or not worsen conditions of equality
between racial groups.

To limit the scope of the discussion in the remainder of this article,
my focus in the sections below will be on the Principle of Treatment as
an Individual Without Regard to Race, and my arguments will be based
in part on examples and problems that are somewhat specific to the
domain of racial classification. Where the context is otherwise clear, I
will refer to the race-specific version of the principle simply as the
Principle of Treatment as an Individual. Although I believe that the
conclusions that I draw from my discussion in the context of race
38. I do not claim that these principles exhaust the legal concept of discrimination. For
example, intentionally harming someone because of pure racial hatred would surely count as
discrimination, even if the act’s rationale did not violate either of these principles. My goal in this
article is not to define discrimination generally but rather to examine one particular
antidiscrimination concept, the principle of individual treatment, especially as invoked to
constrain actions that are putatively rational.
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should apply more generally to contexts involving other enumerated
classifications, I leave open whether the principle is more or less
plausible in the context of race than in the contexts of sex, religion,
national origin, and other enumerated classifications.
IV. EXPLORING THE NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO
TREATMENT AS AN INDIVIDUAL
As discussed in Section II, the Supreme Court regularly asserts the
Principle of Treatment as an Individual (or its individual components)
as an axiom of antidiscrimination law. In order to gain a better
understanding of the normative foundations of the Principle, I test its
application in two contexts: the use of racial classifications in law
enforcement activities and race-based affirmative action. In each
context, I consider potential counterexamples, i.e., examples of
treatment that arguably violate the Principle but are nevertheless
permissible under existing law.39 By reflecting on the substantive moral
distinctions between these apparent counterexamples and actions that
are more clearly prohibited, I attempt to shed light on the substantive
values that underlie the Principle’s verbiage.
A. Racial Profiling v. Racialized Suspect Description
An important problem for discrimination theory is distinguishing
between the objectionable use of “racial profiling” in law enforcement
and the common practice of using race in the context of criminal
suspect descriptions.40 Most people would agree that the former
constitutes wrongful discrimination, but the latter does not.41 Consider
two hypothetical cases.
“Profile.” While investigating a drug trafficking operation, law
enforcement officers receive a tip that two tall males have been sent
as couriers to pick up a shipment of drugs at a crowded train station.
The tip does not contain information about the race of the couriers,
but reliable historical evidence shows that most persons who engage
in this kind of work in the relevant region are of a particular

39. Such cases would be counterexamples to the claim that the Principle of Treatment as an
Individual accurately represents existing antidiscrimination law.
40. For citations to key articles in the literature, see EIDELSON, supra note 8, at 246–47 nn.7–
8.
41. See id. at 186; R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal
Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1075, 1083–88 (2001).
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minority race. On the basis of that evidence, officers focus their
investigative efforts at the train station by stopping and questioning
all tall males matching that racial profile.42
“Suspect Description.”43 A violent crime has just been reported.
Police officers arrive at the scene and separately interview the
victim and multiple witnesses. Each person interviewed credibly
states that the perpetrator, who has fled the area, was a tall white
male. Based on these descriptions, the officers limit their subsequent
search for the perpetrator to tall males matching that racial
description.44

The officers in Profile are clearly violating the anti-generalization
component of the Principle of Treatment as an Individual (the Principle
of Individual Consideration) with respect to the people they stop at the
train station. In picking out members of the minority racial group for
questioning, they assume that those individuals are more likely than
others, merely by virtue of their racial group membership, to be
engaged in illegal drug trafficking. They are thus subjecting those
individuals to adverse treatment based on an inference derived from
their race.
It is less clear what to say about the officers in Suspect Description.
One might argue that they have eliminated non-whites from suspicion
merely because such individuals conclusively fail to satisfy the minimal
conditions for membership in the class of potential suspects, not
because of some inference about them derived from their race; and one
might say, by the same token, that whites remain included in the class
of potential suspects only insofar as there is no conclusive reason to
exclude them from that class, not because of some further race-based
inference about them. Yet, even though all of that would be true, it is
also true that the officers in Suspect Description, like the officers in
Profile, take race into consideration in making determinations about
whom to investigate. Indeed, the officers in Suspect Description are
making an inference45 that non-white persons cannot be the
42. This scenario is a variation of a hypothetical case described in The National Leadership
Conference on Civil and Human Rights, Restoring a National Consensus: the Need to End Racial
Profiling in America 7 (March 2011), http://www.civilrights.org/publications/ reports/racialprofiling2011/racial_profiling2011.pdf.
43. This term has also been used by others. See, e.g., EIDELSON, supra note 8, at 178;
Priyamvada Sinha, Police Use of Race in Suspect Descriptions: Constitutional Considerations, 31
NYU REV. L. & SOCIAL CHANGE 131 (2006); Banks, supra note 41, at 1077.
44. Cf. Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2000).
45. In the hypothetical, the inference is nearly a deductive one. In real-life cases, the
inference would be more probabilistic due to the fallible nature of eyewitness testimony and
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perpetrator; and this inference is certainly derived from their race. Thus,
insofar as the officers are excluding non-whites from suspicion based
on their race, they are treating them preferentially based on an
inference derived from their race. This appears to be a literal violation
of the individual consideration prong of the Principle of Treatment as
an Individual.
According to the Principle of Treatment as an Individual, then, both
the officers in Profile and Suspect Description are engaged in
objectionable discriminatory conduct. Yet, the two cases do not seem
equivalent, and most people would find Profile more problematic than
Suspect Description.46 Assuming that the officers’ conduct in Suspect
Description is legally permissible, the case is a counterexample to the
individual consideration prong of the Principle of Treatment as an
Individual, insofar as that principle purports to fit existing law. The
question, then, is why. Is there some deeper principle or value that
explains why the law should permit the conduct in Suspect Description
while prohibiting the conduct in Profile? If so, this deeper value could
provide a more robust understanding of antidiscrimination law’s
requirement that persons be treated as individuals.
Some helpful guidance can be found in the work of Benjamin
Eidelson on the meaning of treating people as individuals.47 We can
draw profitably on a pair of hypotheticals crafted by Eidelson that I
think are worth recounting here. In his first example, Sally, an Asian
student who happens to be a mediocre violinist, auditions for her school
orchestra. Although she does poorly in her audition, Kevin, the
orchestra director, selects Sally anyway, assuming that she is just having
a bad day; and Eidelson stipulates that Kevin would not have made this
same assumption but for Sally’s race.48 In Eidelson’s second case, Mark,
a young Black law firm associate who happens to have an interest in
wine tasting, goes to lunch with his firm mentor, Jane. During the lunch,
Jane brings up the firm’s basketball team (in which Mark has no
interest) but does not mention the firm’s wine tasting club; and it is

considerations of that kind. For purposes of my analysis, I shall stipulate that there is no
reasonable basis to doubt the reliability of the racial identification in Suspect Description.
46. See EIDELSON, supra note 8, at 178; Banks, supra note 41, at 1083.
47. Benjamin Eidelson, Treating People as Individuals, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF DISCRIMINATION LAW (Deborah Hellman & Sophia Moreau eds., 2013). The idea of treating
a person as an individual is an important component of Eidelson’s broader theory of
discrimination, which he develops in his book, DISCRIMINATION AND DISRESPECT. See
EIDELSON, supra note 8.
48. See Eidelson, supra note 47, at 205.
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stipulated, again, that Jane would have done just the opposite –
mentioning the wine club but not the basketball team – if Mark had
been white.49
Eidelson suggests that we have reason to criticize both Kevin and
Jane in the race-based assumptions that they make about Sally and
Mark, respectively, and he argues that the particular criticism we would
be justified in making is that they both have failed to take Sally and
Mark seriously as individuals.50 The failure to treat Sally and Mark as
individuals, Eidelson explains, is not reducible to a mere error of
reasoning or simple unfairness. Rather, not treating someone as an
individual means failing to give reasonable consideration to that
person’s history of autonomous choices (the person’s “character”) or
“disparaging” that person’s capacity to make future autonomous
choices (the person’s “agency”).51 Treating people as individuals means
“respect[ing] the role they can play and have played in shaping
themselves, rather than treating them as determined by demographic
categories or other matters of statistical fate.”52 In other words, Kevin
and Jane fail to see Sally and Mark as individuals in that they regard
them as predictable functions of the racialized social forces to which
they have been subjected, rather than as autonomous actors who
impose their own choices over time on the social contexts they occupy.
Eidelson’s account of what it means to treat someone as an
individual helps explain a key difference between racial profiling and
suspect description.53 Racial profiling in law enforcement, as typically
characterized, involves imposing higher levels of legal monitoring and
scrutiny on individuals of one race relative to another, based on an
assumption that individuals of the targeted race are more likely in the
aggregate to engage in law breaking activity.54 This assumption is
inconsistent with respect for the autonomy of the individuals burdened
by the practice. Using racial classification as a predictor of action
49. See id. at 205–06.
50. See id. at 208.
51. See id. at 215–16.
52. Id. at 216; EIDELSON, supra note 8, at 145.
53. Surprisingly, Eidelson’s own explanation of the moral difference between profiling and
suspect description does not rely on his discussion of what it means to treat someone as an
individual. Rather, Eidelson argues that racial profiling is morally wrong because it causes a broad
array of personal and social harms. See EIDELSON, supra note 8, at 197–219. My view is that the
key wrong-making feature of racial profiling is the disrespect expressed by that conduct,
regardless of any actual personal or social harm it may bring about.
54. See, e.g., SCHAUER, supra note 8, at 191; Mathias Risse & Richard Zeckhauser, Racial
Profiling, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 131, 136, 144 (2004).
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implies that people are, to the extent predicted, a function of their race.
Imposing burdens on a person because of an imputed, race-linked
likelihood of criminal behavior is tantamount to a rejection of that
person’s capacity to make autonomous individual choices.
What, then, is the moral difference between Profile and Suspect
Description? We cannot simply say that race is an irrelevant factor in
Profile because the race of the potential suspects is unknown, whereas
it is relevant in Suspect Description because the race of the suspect is
known. The Profile hypothetical stipulates facts that arguably make
race a relevant factor in the officers’ decision about how to focus their
investigatory efforts. Of course, if a practice of racial profiling were
based on factually irrelevant considerations of race or undertaken in
bad faith, then it would surely be wrong for that reason as well.55 The
question of interest, however, is why racial profiling should be
problematic even when it might offer a rational or efficient method56 of
making the most of limited law enforcement resources.57
The moral objection to racial profiling based on the failure to
respect autonomy provides an answer to this question. This objection
does not depend on an irrelevance argument. Racial profiling would be
objectionable on grounds of failure to respect autonomy even if we
could rule out bad faith and bias, and even if the correlation between
racial group membership and unlawful behavior was statistically valid.
To be sure, if one accepts the argument that racial profiling violates the
right to be treated as an autonomous individual, one might conclude
that antidiscrimination law requires race to be treated as an irrelevant
consideration in cases like Profile. But this would be a legally
constructed irrelevance. We ascribe irrelevance to race in cases of racial
profiling because we are committed to the requirement of treating
persons as autonomous individuals—even if the available evidence
could justify our believing that members of a particular group were
indeed more likely to engage in particular conduct.58

55. See Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land:
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious
Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1046 (2010).
56. See Risse & Zeckhauser, supra note 54, at 144.
57. For a concise explanation of how consideration of race based on statistical evidence
could be economically rational even in the absence of discriminatory “tastes,” see Kenneth J.
Arrow, What Has Economics to Say About Racial Discrimination?, 12 J. ECON. PERSPS. 91, 96
(1998).
58. Cf. David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 119.
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But if we ascribe irrelevance to race in Profile, why not also in
Suspect Description? The difference is that the consideration of race in
Suspect Description does not require a repudiation of any person’s
autonomy. In Suspect Description, race is a fact associated with a
particular person alleged to have committed a specific datable act;59
and it is a fact that aids in picking out the person who committed that
act from a larger group of potential suspects. But the act whose
perpetrator is being sought in Suspect Description is not regarded as
though it were a statistical function of anyone’s race. Rather, race
serves only as a criterion for determining whether a given suspect and
the perpetrator are one and the same person.
Like racial profiling, racialized suspect descriptions can allow
criminal investigators to do their work more quickly and efficiently
while minimizing the imposition of burdens on innocent parties. But
unlike racial profiling, the use of racialized suspect descriptions does
not involve treating any persons as though their actions were
determined by their race. The focusing of suspicion on people who fit
the racialized suspect description does not necessarily involve an
autonomy-displacing inference from race to action. It is based, instead
on an inference from the observed race of the perpetrator to a
conclusion that people of other races cannot be that perpetrator. Thus,
the racialized investigation Suspect Description does not involve a
failure to treat anyone as an individual under Eidelson’s criteria: it does
not imply any disparagement of individual autonomy nor disregard
anyone’s history of past choices or capacity to make future choices.
Although both racial profiling and the use of race in suspect
descriptions seem to violate the individual consideration prong of the
Principle of Treatment as an Individual, they are distinguishable from
the standpoint of the requirement of respecting autonomy. This
suggests that an important substantive commitment underlying
antidiscrimination law’s demand of individual treatment is that all
persons be respected as individual moral agents capable of making
autonomous choices not dictated by their race.

59. One could alter the facts of Suspect Description to involve a concrete threat of a future
criminal act without turning it into a case of racial profiling. We could imagine, for example, a
scenario in which police receive a reliable report that two Latina women will rob a particular bank
tomorrow, and police focus their search for the would-be robbers on Latinas. The case would still
be one of suspect description rather than racial profiling so long as the purpose of investigation
remains on finding particular suspects who are in the process of attempting a specific datable
criminal act.
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B. The Contested Nature of Affirmative Action
We can gain further insight into the Principle of Treatment as an
Individual—including the individual priority component—by
examining a context of controversy in which those ideas have been
invoked with great regularity: race-based affirmative action, i.e., the
preferential treatment of members of certain racial groups in selection
processes in university admissions and employment. In this section, I
explore the extent to which the Principle of Individual Consideration
and of Individual Priority help us understand antidiscrimination law’s
approach to affirmative action and the nature of the disagreement
about its justification.
First, I address one particularly aggressive version of the argument
that affirmative action violates the Principle of Treatment as an
Individual. This argument says that there is a moral and legal
equivalence between race-based affirmative action on the one hand
and racial profiling in law enforcement on the other:60 “affirmative
action and racial profiling are essentially the same.”61 The claim is that
although their purposes might seem different insofar as “one [policy]
singles out blacks for something desirable and the other singles them
out for something undesirable,”62 they are equally objectionable
because both policies involve treating a person based on assumptions
or generalizations derived from the person’s membership in a racial
group.63 Thus, the argument goes, affirmative action, no less than racial
profiling, fails to satisfy the law’s demand that every person must be
respected as an individual.64
This argument fails for two reasons. First, it helps itself to a
particular theory of the justification of affirmative action that many
might reject. Second, it mistakenly assumes that granting someone a
60. See Ilya Somin, Affirmative Action and Racial Profiling Revisited, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (May 8, 2010), http://volokh.com/2010/05/08/affirmative-action-and-racialprofiling-revisited (arguing that affirmative action and racial profiling are open to similar
objections); see also Richard H. Schuck, Assessing Affirmative Action, 20 NAT’L AFF. 76, 90
(2014).
61. Michael Brus, Proxy War, in JUSTICE: A READER (Michael Sandel ed., 2007).
62. Id.
63. See id. (“[I]t’s safe to say that anyone who is outraged by racial profiling but tolerates
affirmative action, or vice versa, has got it wrong.”).
64. Victor C. Romero, Critical Race Theory in Three Acts: Racial Profiling, Affirmative
Action, and the Diversity Visa Lottery, 66 ALBANY L. REV. 375, 376–77 (2003) (asserting that “the
use of race in law enforcement” and race-based affirmative action in higher education can be seen
as “aspects of a single, broader concept called racial profiling”). Romero ultimately argues,
however, that race-based affirmative action can be distinguished from racial profiling in law
enforcement by appeal to considerations of substantive racial justice. See id. at 385–86.
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preference because of race necessarily entails a failure to treat the
person as an individual.
The first fallacy in the argument that affirmative action and racial
profiling are the same is that it assumes that affirmative action can only
have one possible rationale. But this is not the case. There are at least
three distinct rationales for affirmative action, and the practice as
conceived under two of those rationales is not readily susceptible to the
racial profiling analogy and is not inconsistent with the Principle of
Treatment as an Individual.
One possible justification of affirmative action is the race-as-proxy
rationale. This justification for affirmative action says that institutions
have reason to give favorable consideration to minority racial status
insofar as that status is meaningfully correlated—i.e., serves as a
proxy—for some other characteristic that is directly relevant to
applicable selection criteria.65 The second is the diversity rationale,
which says that schools and employers have reason to give favorable
consideration to minority racial status because the presence of racial
diversity in student bodies and workplaces has consequences that
benefit the internal goals and values of the school or employer.66 Third
is the remedial justification: schools and employers may have reason to
give favorable consideration to an applicant’s minority racial status
when doing so would reverse or correct the selection effects of their
own prior practices of objectionable discrimination.67 Each of these
rationales is subject to different analysis vis-à-vis the requirement of
individual consideration and prioritizing persons over groups.
The race-as-proxy version of affirmative action is the version that
critics who claim an equivalence between affirmative action and racial
profiling tend to posit.68 Typically, the critic will claim that affirmative

65. Cf. Eugene Volokh, Diversity, Race as Proxy, and Religion as Proxy, 43 UCLA L. REV.
2059, 2062 (1996).
66. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (suggesting that the Supreme Court
has neither endorsed nor rejected the diversity rationale as a justification for affirmative action
under Title VII).
67. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–94 (1989); Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277–78 (1986); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,
215 (1979); Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1550 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Local 28 of the
Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 448–49 (1986) (discussing judicial power
under Title VII to order affirmative action as remedy following a finding of discrimination). See
generally Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity, Integration, and Affirmative
Action in the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 3–4 (2005).
68. Recall the title of the essay that I discussed earlier: “Proxy War.” See Brus, supra note
61, at 261.
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action is premised upon regarding race as a proxy for some other trait,
such as “racial victimization, poverty, [or] cultural deprivation.”69 And,
as the criticism usually goes, the correlation is specious.70
This is the sort of thought that may have been behind Justice Alito’s
line of questioning during oral argument in the first round of Fisher v.
University of Texas.71 In that exchange, Justice Alito asked the
University to consider a hypothetical in which “you have two
applicants who are absolutely the same in every respect . . . [and] both
come from affluent backgrounds,” but one is a racial minority and one
is not.72 Why, Justice Alito asked, should we think that this hypothetical
minority applicant “deserve[s] a leg-up” in the admissions process?73
Implicit in the question is an assumption that affirmative action seeks
to give a leg-up to minorities, because minorities tend to come from
social circumstances that place them at an unfair disadvantage relative
to non-minority applicants. In other words, Justice Alito assumed that
affirmative action relies on racial minority status as a proxy for unfair
social disadvantage. This is why he sees the affluent minority applicant
as a problematic case for affirmative action proponents: it is a case in
which the assumed proxy relationship fails to hold.
As noted, the race-as-proxy rationale tends to be more often
articulated by critics than by proponents of affirmative action. Thus, the
real action in the contemporary affirmative action debate lies
elsewhere. But it is still useful to think about whether race-as-proxybased affirmative action violates the Principle of Treatment as an
Individual. The assumption that a person comes from poverty or has
been victimized by discrimination may be true or false, but those are
factors largely outside the realm of autonomy or choice, insofar as no
one controls the socioeconomic conditions into which one is born. Thus,
falsely assuming those things about a person based on his or her race
may not necessarily disparage his or her past autonomous choices or
future capacity for choice. But erroneously assuming, because of a
person’s race, that he grew up in challenging social circumstances is
likely to be the result of stereotypical associations between minority
status and choices or behaviors that contribute to the condition of

69. Id.
70. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995).
71. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
72. Transcript of Oral Argument at 61, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411
(2013) (No. 11-345).
73. Id. at 44.
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poverty. Obviously, that kind of linkage is an insult to personal
autonomy. The use of race as a proxy for low socio-economic status is
also open to the additional objections that the proxy relationship is not
sufficiently strong to be relied on; and even if it were, since it is not clear
what benefit would be gained by relying on the proxy of race rather
than giving positive consideration directly to applicants who meet that
description, there is no good reason to rely on the proxy.74
A slightly different version of the race-as-proxy rationale regards
race as a proxy for particular viewpoints that could add to the richness
of discourse in an otherwise all-white classroom, or perhaps a
contrarian voice that could reduce blind spots or promote out-of-thebox thinking in workplace teams and management deliberations.75
Being a member of a minority racial group is a proxy, on this view, for
a propensity to contribute a dissenting, nonconforming, or contrarian
voice to discourse or teamwork that would otherwise be dominated by
orthodoxy and groupthink. This rationale is also vulnerable to the
objection that it violates the Principle of Individual Consideration,
interpreted in light of the requirement of respecting the autonomy of
individuals. The rationale regards a person’s capacity to make valuable
contributions to discourse and deliberation as in part a function of the
person’s race. When we say that a person’s minority racial status gives
us reason to believe that the person will express a certain set of
viewpoints or engage in certain modes of discourse, we treat the
person’s thoughts, beliefs, and ways of relating to others – which some
would argue lie at the heart of the capacity to make autonomous
choices – as determined by something external to the person’s agency.
Assuming that a person will bring underrepresented viewpoints to a
discourse because that person is an underrepresented minority fails to
respect that person as an individual, because it implicitly repudiates the
person’s autonomous capacity to think and speak in ways that might
not be expected.76 Affirmative action, to the extent conceived in terms
of the race-as-proxy-for-discourse-enhancing-potential rationale,
violates the requirement of individual consideration in ways that are
closely analogous to racial profiling.
74. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, On Class-Not-Race, in A NATION OF WIDENING
OPPORTUNITIES: THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT 50 (Samuel Bagenstos & Ellen Katz, eds., 2015)
(describing the argument).
75. See Volokh, supra note 65.
76. See Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 621 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the use of “race as a proxy” for underrepresented viewpoints is “the hallmark of an
unconstitutional policy”).
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The diversity rationale for affirmative action is the only one that
has been given constitutional validity by the Supreme Court in the
university admissions context.77 Although critics tend to conflate the
diversity rationale and one or both versions of the race-as-proxy
rationale, they are distinct. According to the diversity rationale, the
existence of racial diversity in a population activates certain benefits
for all individuals in the hosting community.78 The premise is not that
race is a stand-in for some other quality or trait that then produces the
benefit. Instead, the idea is that the existence of racial diversity itself is
a condition that operates on human social psychology in such a way as
to result in improved learning environments, reduction of bias and
stereotypes, improved productivity in a workplace setting,79 and so on.80
The diversity rationale is not completely free from worries from the
standpoint of treating people as individuals. There may be a concern
that admitting a minority student in order to activate certain
institutional benefits associated with diversity is tantamount to using
the student in the same way that a catalyst might be used to trigger a
desired chemical reaction. Valuing the student for the contribution he
makes to racial diversity may be to regard the student as a “de-biasing”
instrument rather than as an individual with a history of autonomous
choices and a capacity to make future autonomous choices. And
furthermore, even if the presence of a minority student has the
beneficial effects intended, one might argue that those benefits come
about as a result of psychological processes that largely lie outside of a
person’s autonomous control.
But at the same time, if there is indeed a worry here, it does not
seem to be quite the same as the concern implicated in Eidelson’s
hypotheticals or in racial profiling. There is a difference between (a)
predicting the actions that a person will perform based on his racial
group membership and (b) predicting how a person’s presence, in light
of his racial group membership, will affect the social psychological
dynamics of a given community. Whereas (a) invokes racial
classification in a way that tends to displace the significance of the
person’s autonomous choices, (b) is more a claim that awareness of race
77. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016); Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003).
78. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2210.
79. The diversity rationale has not been endorsed by the Supreme Court as a basis for
affirmative action under Title VII.
80. See Patrick Shin & Mitu Gulati, Cultivating Inclusion, 112 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 117, 120 (2014).
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can, through the operation of our psychologies, have an effect on the
quality of our autonomous choices.
Although the diversity rationale may imply that affirmative action
entails using people as passive instruments in some sense, this does not
necessarily violate the Principle of Treatment as an Individual, as long
as all admitted students are also valued for the qualities that are
associated with aspects of their autonomous agency. Certainly, there is
nothing in Eidelson’s account that implies that treating someone as an
individual requires valuing a person only for those qualities over which
the person exercises autonomous choice. Thus, even if the diversity
rationale may involve viewing a person’s racial group membership in
an instrumental way, it does not necessarily entail the treatment of
individuals in a way that fails to respect their autonomy.
Furthermore, if one takes seriously the educational benefits of
diversity, one can appreciate a more positive relation between
affirmative action and treating persons as individuals. The point of
affirmative action, according to the diversity rationale, is that a diverse
student body or workplace provides a context in which people can
develop more robust connections and collaborations with a wider
variety of individuals.81 The more that stereotypes are broken down and
bias reduced, the more it becomes possible for people to mutually
recognize and respect others not as mere predictable functions of their
given social circumstances, but as individuals with a history of
autonomous choices and a capacity to exercise their autonomy in the
future. Populating a community in such a way as to foster beneficial
racial dynamics helps create conditions in which every member can
flourish in the exercise of their individual agency and learn to respect
the individuality of others. From this perspective, affirmative action
according to the diversity rationale ultimately seeks to realize the value
of treating people as individuals, even if it also assumes that people are
partly the product of psychological processes that they do not entirely
control.
Of the three rationales for affirmative action, the remedial
justification for affirmative action is in some ways the most intriguing.
It contradicts the Principle of Treatment as an Individual more
explicitly than the other two, and yet remains the only justification that
has so far been accepted by the Supreme Court in employment cases

81. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325; Ronald Turner, Grutter, the Diversity Justification, and
Workplace Affirmative Action, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 199, 206–07, 233–34 (2005).
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under Title VII (private employment) or the Equal Protection Clause
(public).82 The remedial justification permits institutional actors to take
race-conscious steps to eradicate current distributional patterns that
are traceable to the institution’s own past discrimination.83 In effect, it
allows employers to give preference to members of particular racial
groups for the sake of improving local conditions of group inequality.
This seems to fly in the face of the Principle of Individual Priority, the
second prong of the Principle of Treatment as an Individual.84
At root, the Principle of Individual Priority is an affirmation of the
modern concept of individual rights. The basic idea, familiar from
contemporary liberal political philosophy, is that basic individual rights
and liberties are lexically prior to considerations of distributive
equality. Everyone must be guaranteed equal rights and liberties before
any redistribution can be undertaken; and a person’s rights and
liberties cannot be part of what is redistributed for the sake of equality
or group interests. They are, to that extent, inviolable. This is not to say
that individual rights can never be justifiably infringed for the sake of
group interests, but individual rights would amount to little if they
could not generally withstand the countervailing pressures of collective
welfare or intergroup equality. The relevant point for purposes of the
present discussion is that the Principle of Individual Priority is closely
tied to this notion of the inviolability of rights as against claims of group
welfare.
Notice that the remedial justification for affirmative action is not
directly inconsistent with the Principle of Individual Consideration (as
distinguished from the Principle of Individual Priority). Giving racial
minorities a preference in selection decisions to reverse “manifest
racial imbalance[s]”85 caused by prior discrimination does not entail
82. There is some dispute about whether United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)
and Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa Clara, 480 U.S. 616, 637 (1987) restrict affirmative action
under Title VII to purposes that are truly “remedial.” For an argument that they do, see Estlund,
supra note 67, at 3–5. For the view that Weber and Johnson may permit affirmative action under
Title VII that is not strictly remedial, see Rebecca Hanner White, Affirmative Action in the
Workplace: The Significance of Grutter?, 92 KY. L.J. 263, 274 (2003).
83. Cf. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 504–05, 509 (1989).
84. In cases that are “remedial” in the strictest sense – where a defendant is found liable for
discrimination and race-conscious measures are imposed as a judicial remedy – the plaintiffs can
be regarded as having a legal right to the race-conscious remedial measure. See Regents of Univ.
of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978). In such circumstances, it becomes difficult to argue
that the race-conscious remedy violates any right of individual treatment, since the remedy itself
becomes embodied as an individual right. But cases like Weber and the context of higher
education generally speaking do not present remedial scenarios in this strict sense.
85. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 209.
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any racially-derived inference that would be inconsistent with respect
for anyone’s autonomy as an agent. The basis of such a remedial
preference is not any generalization about the traits or dispositions of
members of a group, but rather the desirability of correcting the
consequences of past discriminatory practices that, if allowed to
remain, would stand as an enduring emblem of the employer’s past
failures to respect all persons as individuals.86
There does appear to be a rather direct conflict, however, between
the remedial justification for affirmative action and the individual
priority component of the Principle of Treatment as an Individual.
Race-conscious measures that are designed to correct “imbalances”
effectively impose a disadvantage on some individuals for the sake of
reducing intergroup disparities. This violates the Principle of Individual
Priority.87 Why, then, should remedial affirmative action (as in Weber)
be permitted?
Just as we compared racial profiling and suspect description to tease
out how they might be distinguished vis-à-vis the Principle of
Individual Consideration, it is useful to explore how remedial
affirmative action is different from a related practice that is clearly
impermissible under principles of individual treatment: the use of
quotas. To be clear, one should note that quotas are a mechanism for
producing racial balance or diversity, while the remedial justification
for affirmative action is a rationale for race-conscious action; so the two
practices are in some sense orthogonal. But it is nevertheless instructive
to ask, if remedial affirmative action of the kind discussed in Weber is
legally permissible, then why not quotas? Suppose, for example, that a
university with a regrettably low population of black students decides
to adopt an admissions policy that sets aside a fixed number of seats

86. See id. at 204; see also Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa Clara, 480 U.S. 616, 637
(1987).
87. In some ways, the remedial justification can be seen as a limited concession to Owen
Fiss’s anti-subordination theory of equal treatment, according to which affirmative action would
be permissible to the extent that it alleviated group inequality and stratification. See Owen M.
Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 157 (1976) (suggesting
that a law or practice should be regarded as violating constitutional principles of equality only if
it “aggravates (or perpetuates?) the subordinate position of a specially disadvantaged group”).
The Supreme Court’s insistence on the Principle of Individual Priority is an explicit rejection of
Fiss’s anti-subordination approach. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200,
223–30 (1995); see also Michael C. Dorf, A Partial Defense of an Anti-Discrimination Principle, in
ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP: THE ORIGINS AND FATE OF ANTISUBORDINATION THEORY
(2002) (characterizing Fiss’s theory as a “period piece, a relic of a more egalitarian but bygone
era”).
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for black students88 for the purpose of increasing the diversity of its
student body. Such a policy would certainly be a legally impermissible89
example of failing to respect the priority of the individual over groups.90
But what are the underlying moral concerns?
The Supreme Court has asserted that the problem with this kind of
quota is that it deprives white applicants, solely on the basis of their
race, of the opportunity to compete for the seats reserved for black
applicants, while black applicants are permitted to compete for all of
the seats without limitation.91 But the practical effect of this
purportedly unfair competition boils down to nothing more than a
reduction of the admissions chances of white applicants relative to
black applicants. In that regard, it is hard to see a clear distinction
between quota-based affirmative action and post-Grutter policies
based on holistic review. An effective holistic affirmative action policy
will also have the effect of reducing the admissions chances of whites
relative to blacks (otherwise, the policy would be pointless); and a
holistic policy that gives significant weight to race could theoretically
reduce white admission rates even more than a modest quota-based
policy.
The objections that truly drive the law’s resistance to quotas lie not
in any diminishment of opportunity for majority racial groups, but
rather in the perceived risk of negative social consequences associated
with their use and, just as importantly, their symbolic meaning. There is,
first, a fear that if the law were to permit the use of racial quotas, this
would deepen racial divisions in society, create racial resentment, and
perpetuate discriminatory attitudes.92 The problem with quotas,
according to this perspective, is that they are likely to result in “racial
balkanization.”93
Second, quotas symbolize a sort of insensitivity to individual
differences within groups. What seems to trouble the Court is that in a
system of set-asides, people can feel as though they are “reduced to

88. This hypothetical policy is similar to the one that was invalidated in Bakke. See Regents
of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 278–79 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
89. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (asserting that fixed set-asides amount to “outright racial
balancing, which is patently unconstitutional”).
90. See Julie C. Suk, Quotas and Consequences, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
DISCRIMINATION LAW 232 (Deborah Hellman & Sophia Moreau eds., 2013).
91. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319–20.
92. See Suk, supra note 90, at 233–35 (discussing consequentialist arguments against quotas).
93. See id.

SHIN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

132

10/10/2016 5:41 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 12:1

pure numbers,” to use Justice Kennedy’s language in Fisher II.94 Quotas
by their nature emphasize quantity as a decisive consideration. The
emphasis on quantity evokes a process in which the predominant mode
of evaluation is counting. And the notion of counting to fill a quota
strongly connotes the fungibility of the members of each quota-limited
group. It is perhaps understandable, then, that an adverse selection
decision in a quota-based system might be experienced as a denial of
respect for individuals, especially in contexts such as higher education
where success tends to be associated with personal achievement,
character, and promise.95 A quota-driven rejection might very well feel
to the unsuccessful white applicant as if it were predicated upon a
negative inference about the applicant’s individual character based on
his race. From the applicant’s perspective, the rejection could be
interpreted as a violation not only of the Principle of Individual
Priority, but also of the Principle of Individual Consideration.
Thus, although the Supreme Court has authorized race conscious
affirmative action to remedy significant intergroup imbalances that are
the vestiges of past discriminatory wrongs (such as in Weber), quotas
remain an impermissible form of such action, because they violate not
only the Principle of Individual Priority, but they are also contrary to
the norms of respect that underlie the Principle of Individual
Consideration. This suggests that race-conscious action that conflicts
with the Principle of Individual Priority may be permitted when
necessary to correct significant inequalities of opportunity attributable
to known past practices of discrimination with respect to those specific
opportunities,96 but only by means of policies that are sufficiently
tempered (in duration and manner of implementation) so as not to
“unnecessarily trammel the interests”97 of non-minorities or evince
disrespect for individuals.
This conclusion is in some ways similar to the analysis I suggested
in the context of racial profiling in law enforcement. There, I argued
that adherence to the Principle of Individual Consideration requires
94. 136 S. Ct. at 2210.
95. See Suk, supra note 90, at 231. Suk quotes Alexander Bickel’s strong condemnation of
quotas: “[A] racial quota derogates the human dignity and individual of all to whom it is applied.”
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1974).
96. The Supreme Court has been adamant to reject affirmative action as a remedy for
“societal discrimination.” See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 731 (2007); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986). To allow race-conscious
action whenever necessary to correct disparities attributable to societal discrimination generally
would eviscerate the Principle of Individual Priority, since such disparities are ubiquitous.
97. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
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ascribing irrelevance to statistical considerations that might very well
be epistemically valid reasons for the allocation of limited law
enforcement and monitoring resources. In a somewhat similar way,
adherence to the Principle of Individual Consideration requires the
rejection of quotas, even though they might be an effective way of
accomplishing an otherwise permissible remedial purpose of reducing
local group inequalities that stand as vestiges of past discrimination.
CONCLUSION: AUTONOMY AND EQUALITY
The oft-repeated dictum that antidiscrimination law guarantees
individual consideration and protects “persons, not groups” can be
fleshed out as a compound principle. This principle prohibits treatment
of persons based on inferences derived from a person’s classification in
certain enumerated categories and prohibits reliance on
generalizations about groups defined by those classifications, and
invalidates justifications of the treatment of persons that appeal to
group interests or conditions of intergroup equality. I have tried to
show that this framework of constraints is underwritten by a
fundamental commitment to a moral requirement of taking people
seriously as individuals – autonomous actors who are shaped by their
own past choices and have the capacity to exercise their future agency
in ways that are not merely a function of the social contexts they
occupy, combined with a commitment to the concept of individual
rights as bulwarks against countervailing interests of collective welfare
or intergroup equality.
A notable aspect of my account of the Principle of Individual
Consideration and Individual Priority is that it suggests that these are
noncomparative concepts98 of respect for autonomy and the
inviolability of individual rights. They are not truly principles of
equality, even though they tend to be frequently invoked as
commitments of the Equal Protection Clause. Chief Justice Roberts in
Parents Involved invoked the “persons not groups” principle in a
crucial step of his argument. But in the last part of his opinion, he also
quoted from a case in which the Court had said that the problem with
treating someone differently based on racial group membership is that
it “demeans the [person’s] dignity and worth.”99 I do not think that the
language of dignity occurred accidentally here. Rather, I think that
98. For an illuminating discussion of the difference between comparative and
noncomparative conceptions of discrimination, see Hellman, supra note 11.
99. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 746 (quoting Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000)).
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Justice Roberts invoked the value of dignity because that value is
intimately connected to respect for autonomy and the inviolability of
rights, which in turn, as I have argued, is what underlies the two
components of the Principle of Treatment as an Individual.
If that Principle is ultimately a manifestation of respect for
autonomy and the inviolability of rights, rather than a principle of
equality, it becomes easier to explain why the Principle can seem
sometimes at odds with the Supreme Court’s willingness to allow the
use of racial classifications in the context of diversity-based affirmative
action and especially remedial affirmative action. The justification of
affirmative action policies is rooted in concerns about distributive
equality and remediation of group subordination. Affirmative action, I
have suggested, is not necessarily inconsistent with respect for
autonomy, but the need for such policies is a reflection of the limits of
noncomparative, autonomy- and rights-based approaches to solving
the problem of entrenched social inequality.100
Finally, the discussion of this article shows that the principles of
individual consideration and individual priority are not self-contained,
self-justifying theorems of antidiscrimination law. These principles limit
themselves, more or less by brute force, to the specific categories that
are enumerated as problematic, either in legislative enactments (e.g.
Title VII) or in the Court’s common law constitutional jurisprudence
(e.g. “suspect classification” doctrine). These categories cannot be
somehow logically derived from considerations that are completely
internal to the principles of individual treatment themselves. Rather,
they can only be explained with reference to historically contingent
patterns of unjust deprivation, concerns about enduring inequalities,
and the politics and priorities of social reform movements.101 The point,
again, is not that the Principle of Treatment as an Individual is wrong
as far as it goes, but rather that it cannot itself explain
antidiscrimination law in its entirety. Indeed, it is the other way around:
it takes a theory of discrimination and equality to explain certain
aspects of the Principle. The Principle of Treatment as an Individual,
underwritten by the value of respect for autonomy and the inviolability
of rights, may capture an important strand of antidiscrimination law,
but it cannot by itself purport to be exhaustive of it.

100. See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 767 (2011).
101. See Bagenstos, supra note 3, at 846–48; see also Shin, supra note 12, at 169–72.

